

Message Text

SECRET POSS DUPE

PAGE 01 AMMAN 01135 01 OF 03 011309Z

42

ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W
----- 071388

R 011100Z MAR 76
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7128
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USINT BAGHDAD

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 AMMAN 1135

EXDIS

DEPT PASS USCINCEUR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PINT, PFOR, US, JO

SUBJECT: ANNUAL POLICY ASSESSMENT

1. SUMMARY: THIS CABLE SUMMARIZES ANNUAL POLICY ASSESSMENT BEING GIVEN WIDER DISTRIBUTION SHORTLY BY AIRGRAM.

2. U.S.-JORDANIAN TIES, WHILE CLOSE AND IMPORTANT TO BOTH SIDES, WERE WEAKENED DURING THE PAST YEAR. JORDAN CONCLUDES (A) THAT OUR PEACE EFFORTS HAVE NOT PRODUCED MUCH FOR JORDAN, (B) THE ISRAELI LOBBY IN US AND WITH CONGRESS IS STRONGER THAN IT THOUGHT, (C) THE RELIABILITY OF US COMMITMENTS (INCLUDING WEAPONS SUPPLIES) IS QUESTIONABLE, AND (D) JORDAN NO LONGER OCCUPIES A UNIQUE PLACE AMONG THE ARABS IN THE MIDDLE EAST POLICY. IF THE JORDANIANS BELIEVED THE 82ND AIRBORNE WOULD HAVE COME TO THEIR RESCUE IN 1970, THEY CERTAINLY DO NOT BELIEVE SO NOW.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 AMMAN 01135 01 OF 03 011309Z

3. CONCURRENTLY, JORDAN HAS TRIED TO

IMPROVE ITS ARAB TIES, PARTICULARLY WITH SYRIA--A RAPPROCHEMENT THAT WE BELIEVE WILL GROW. WHILE JORDAN WILL TRY TO MODERATE SYRIA'S BEHAVIOR, THERE ARE DANGERS THAT SYRIA WILL ALSO DRAW AMMAN ALONG ITS OWN RADICAL COURSE IN MIDEAST DIPLOMACY.

4. OUR CONTINUING INFLUENCE IN JORDAN WOULD BE MOST ENHANCED BY SUCCESSFUL PEACE INITIATIVES, AND WILL REQUIRE A CAREFUL NURTURING OF JORDANIANS' SOMETIMES EMOTIONAL SENSITIVITIES, NIMBLE FOOTWORK ON OUR PART TO KEEP DEVELOPMENTS ON COURSE, AND REASSURANCES THAT WE HAVE AN INTEREST IN JORDAN'S AND THE REGIME'S LONG TERM VIABILITY.

5. WE BELIEVE OUR ACTIONS WITHIN THE COMING YEAR SHOULD BE FOCUSED ON DEVELOPMENT THAT WILL --REINFORCE JORDAN'S WILL AND ABILITY TO PURSUE A MODERATE, INDEPENDENT POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST, ESPECIALLY VIS-A-VIS SYRIA AND THE FEDAYEEN. MILITARY AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS AT SIGNIFICANT FUNDING LEVELS ARE IMPORTANT TO THIS EFFORT;
--GET JORDAN'S SUPPORT FOR OUR EFFORTS TO KEEP PEACE NEGOTIATIONS GOING. SHOULD WE MOVE TOWARD INCLUDING THE PLO IN NEGOTIATIONS, WE MUST PROVIDE EARLY WARNING AND ALSO SIGNAL TO THE GOJ OUR INTEREST IN CONTINUING OUR LONG TERM SPECIAL TIES TO JORDAN.
--OBTAIN JORDANIAN SUPPORT ON MULTILATERAL DIPLOMATIC ISSUES CONSISTENT WITH OUT AND JORDAN'S MAJOR INTERESTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST;
--STRENGTHEN THE POLITICAL STABILITY OF KING HUSSEIN'S REGIME AS THE BEST OF THE LIKELY ALTERNATIVES IN TERMS OF OUR INTERESTS. WE WILL TRY TO USE OUR ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS IN WAYS THAT INCREASE THE GOJ'S CONCERN AND ACTION WITH REGARD TO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL WELFARE AND EQUITY. END SUMMARY.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 AMMAN 01135 01 OF 03 011309Z

6. OVERVIEW.

A. IN 1975 WE HAVE SEEN WHAT THE JORDANIANS PERCEIVE AS A RUN-DOWN IN US EFFORTS TOWARD PEACE IN THE AREA. WHAT HAS REPLACED IT IS INCREASING ARAB FACTIONAL INFIGHTING AND SYRIAN ASSUMPTION OF SOME LEADERSHIP ON THE ARAB SIDE ON WHERE THINGS GO NEXT.

B. FOR THE US THIS HAS MEANT A COOLING OFF

IN THE POST-OCTOBER WAR HONEYMOON WITH JORDAN. SEVERAL FACTORS HAVE INFLUENCED THIS: THE FAILURE OF DISENGAGEMENT EFFORTS TO PRODUCE ANYTHING FOR JORDAN IN 1974 AND THE SUBSEQUENT RABAT SUMMIT IN WHICH THE JORDANIANS HAVE ALLOTTED TO US (AND THE US HAS TOLD THEM IT ACCEPTS) SOME BLAME; THE HAWK MISSILE EPISODE OF 1975; THE INCREASING PERCEPTION OF JORDAN THAT THE US CONGRESS AND, TO AN EXTENT THE ISRAELI LOBBY, HAS GAINED GREAT INFLUENCE IN US MIDDLE EASTERN POLICY; US APPARENT INABILITY TO TAKE ON THE SOVIETS IN PLACES LIKE ANGOLA; AND A PERCEPTION THAT THE US IS NOT AS RELIABLE AS PREVIOUSLY AS A WEAPONS SUPPLIER AND MILITARY SUPPORTER. THE LAST COUNT IS ILLUSTRATED BY THE FACT THAT IF THE JORDANIANS THOUGHT THE 82ND AIRBORNE WOULD HAVE COME TO THEIR RESCUE IN 1970, THEY CERTAINLY DO NOT THINK SO NOW.

C. CONCURRENTLY, THE JORDANIANS HAVE BEGUN A PROCESS OF IMPROVING ARAB TIES. FOR A NUMBER OF REASONS (WHICH HAVE BEEN EXPLORED AND ASSESSED EARLIER) THE TREND HAS FOCUSSED HEAVILY TOWARD SYRIA. THERE APPEARS TO BE GROWING, FOLLOWING THE EARLY HEADLONG RUSH TO DAMASCUS, A TENDENCY TO TEMPER THE SPEED OF RAPPROCHMENT. WE STILL BELIEVE THE CURRENT DIRECTION IS TOWARD THE SLOW EVOLUTION OF CONFEDERAL TIES WITH DYRIA. IT IS TOO EARLY OBVIOUSLY TO PREDICT THE RESULTS, I.E. HOW FAR THIS EVOLUTION WILL GO AND WHAT THE FINAL STAGE MIGHT BE. THERE IS STILL MUCH OPPOSITION IN JORDAN TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF SUCH TIES.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 AMMAN 01135 01 OF 03 011309Z

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED USCINCEUR.

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 AMMAN 01135 02 OF 03 011352Z

42

ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W
----- 071932

R 011100Z MAR 76
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7129
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USINT BAGHDAD

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 3 AMMAN 1135

EXDIS

DEPT PASS USCINCEUR

D. JORDANIANS DO NOT SEEM AT THIS POINT TO BE DEEPLY CONCERNED BY ANOTHER TREND--THE GRADUAL, BUT STILL PERCEPTIBLE EFFORT OF THE UNITED STATES TO COME TO GRIPS WITH THE PALESTINIANS AND THE PLO.

E. FOR THE FUTURE, THE SINGLE MOST SIGNIFICANT FACTOR WILL BE THE ISSUE OF WAR OR PEACE IN THE AREA. JORDAN, WE BELIEVE, WILL CONTINUE TO ACT IN WAYS WHICH IT PERCEIVES WILL MODERATE THE COURSE OF EVENTS. HOWEVER, AS JORDAN GROWN CLOSER TO SYRIA, AND WE ASSUME THE RELATIONSHIP WILL PROBABLY BE CLOSE AS LONG AS ASAD IS IN POWER, THERE ARE DANGERS THAT JORDAN'S ATTEMPTS TO MODERATE SYRIAN VIEWS WILL BE OVERCOME BY SYRIAN ATTEMPTS TO BRING JORDAN ALONG WITH IT.

F. OUR INFLUENCE IN JORDAN OVER THE NEXT YEAR AND BEYOND WILL DEPEND ON A NUMBER OF FACTORS. FIRST AND MOST IMPORTANT WILL BE HOW EFFECTIVE
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 AMMAN 01135 02 OF 03 011352Z

WE CAN BE ABOUT PEACE INITIATIVES. SHOULD WE REGAIN THE INITIATIVE IN THIS AREA, JORDAN IS LIKELY TO TEMPER ITS PRESENT COURSE OF SPREADING ITSELF AROUND THE ARAB WORLD, AND ESPECIALLY SYRIA, AND THUS THE POTENTIAL OF COMING UNDER GREAT RADICAL INFLUENCE. SIMILARLY, OUR GENERAL CONDUCT OF FOREIGN POLICY AND THE RESPONSIVENESS OF OUR ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS WILL BE SIGNIFICANT FACTORS IN KEEPING JORDAN MODERATE AND HELPFUL. WHILE TO DO SO IS ILLOGICAL AND SOMEWHAT NAIVE FOR THEM, THE JORDANIANS ARE ALSO FLIRTING WITH THE

SOVIETS. THE DANGERS ARE THAT IN A SMALL STATE, UNDER VIRTUAL ONE-MAN RULE, PERSONAL EMOTIONS CAN SOMETIMES SUBSTITUTE FOR SUPERIOR LOGIC IN DETERMINING NATIONAL INTERESTS AND COURSES OF ACTION. HERE QUIET COUNSELING AND A QUICK RESPONSE TO WELL-CONCEIVED REQUESTS FOR ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE ARE THE BEST MEANS OF HELPING SET A SENSIBLE COURSE FOR THE FUTURE.

G. IN SUM, THE YEAR AHEAD, BARRING THE UNFORESEEN, LOOKS LIKE A MORE LIVELY VERSION OF THE YEAR PAST. WE WILL NEED TO CONTINUE TO BE QUICK ON OUR FEET TACTICALLY TO KEEP DEVELOPMENTS ON COURSE. OVER THE LONG RUN THE JORDANIANS NEED TO HAVE A BETTER IDEA OF OUR BASIC STRATEGY FOR THE AREA AND NEED AS WELL A REKINDLING OF FAITH AND CONFIDENCE IN WHAT WE ARE DOING. HAPPILY, THE KING'S COMING VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES PROVIDES A UNIQUE OPPORTUNITY FOR US TO DO THIS.

7. IN ASSESSING THE PAST YEAR'S DEVELOPMENTS AND TRENDS AND ESTABLISHING POLICY OBJECTIVES AND PROGRAMS FOR YEAR AHEAD, WE SEE JORDAN AS IMPORTANT TO THE UNITED STATES BECAUSE
--ITS LONG FRONTIER WITH ISRAEL AND ITS CENTRAL LOCATION IN THE AREA MAKE IT DIRECTLY IMPORTANT TO ARAB AND ISRAELI CALCULATIONS ABOUT ANOTHER WAR AND IN REGULATING THE FEDAYEEN'S ABILITY TO PROVOKE ANOTHER WAR;
--AS A MODERATE STATE,ITS POTENTIAL PARTICIPATION IN NEGOTIATIONS AND ITS POTENTIAL FOR MODERATE INFLUENCE ON OTHER ARABS OFFER AN OPTION FOR MAINTAINING THE MOMEMTUM OF PEACE TALKS;
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 AMMAN 01135 02 OF 03 011352Z

--IT CONTRIBUTES TO POLITICAL STABILITY IN THE ARAB PENINSULA;
-- IT OFFERS PROSPECTS OF OCCASIONAL DEFECTION FROM THIRD WORLD BOLC VOITNG ON NON-MIDDLE EAST MULTILATER DIPLOMATIC ISSUES.

8. IN THE YEAR AHEAD, WE WANT TO ENCOURAGE JORDAN'S WISH TO AVOID WAR WITH ISRAEL AND STRENGTHEN ITS ABILITY TO PURSUE AN INDEPENDENT AND MODERATE POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THAT MEANS IN PART TRYING TO CIRCUMSCRIBE JORDAN'S INCREASINGLY CLOSE TIES WITH SYRIA. WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO PROVIDE JORDAN WITH THE WHEREWITHAL AND COOPERATION TO BE CAPABLE OF ADEQUATELY DEFENDING ITSELF AGAINST SYRIA (AND IRAQ) AND THE FEDAYEEN. THUS, WE SHOULD ASSIGN JORDAN HIGH PRIORITY IN STATE -DOD PLANNING FOR ASSISTANCE FUNDS TO ACQUIRE NEEDED WEAPONS AND TRAINING SLOTS, AND ALSO MAINTAIN USG

DISPOSITION TO CONTINUE HIGH-LEVEL, SPECIAL EFFORTS QUICKLY TO OVERCOME AD HOC AND OPERATIONAL SNAGS IN OUR PROGRAMS, SUCH AS THOSE CONCERNED WITH FINANCING JORDAN'S HAWK MISSILES. WE ALSO WANT TO CONTINUE HIGH LEVEL REASSURANCE OF U.S. SUPPORT OF JORDAN'S INDEPENDENT, MODERATE POSITION AND ROLE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, THROUGH CONTINUED SENIOR LEVEL VISITS, CONSULTATIONS, AND BRIEFINGS, AND ACTIVE SUPPORT WHERE APPROPRIATE OF JORDAN'S DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES. WE ALSO INTEND TO CALL JORDAN'S ATTENTION TO INSTANCES IN WHICH IT UNDERMINES ITS OWN MODERATE STANCE, THUS JEOPARDIZING JORDANIAN AS WELL AS OUR INTERESTS.

9. WE COULD DO LITTLE (PRESUMING WE WANTED TO) TO REVERSE JORDAN'S CURRENT RELUCTANCE TO PARTICIPATE IN WEST BANK NEGOTIATIONS, OTHER THAN PRESS ISRAEL TO BE MORE GENEROUS IN ITS INITIAL OFFER FOR TALKS (ALSO IN ITSELF A SEEMING NON-STARTER). IF WE MOVE IN THE DIRECTION OF INVOLVING THE PLO IN THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS, WE WILL NEED TO GIVE KING HUSSEIN EARLY WARNING AND A REASSURANCE OF OUR CONTINUING RECOGNITION OF JORDAN'S IMPORTANCE TO A PEACE SETTLEMENT AND OUR SUSTAINED INTEREST IN CLOSE SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 AMMAN 01135 02 OF 03 011352Z

BILATERAL TIES. OUR GOING MILITARY AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS WILL ALSO HELP IN THIS, AND WE SHOULD ALSO LOOK AT NEW INITIATIVES IN BUILDING LONG TERM ECONOMIC AND COMMERCIAL TIES BEYOND THOSE OF MUTUAL SECURITY. MEANWHILE, WE WANT TO KEEP JORDAN FROM PUBLICLY CRITICIZING OUR PEACE EFFORTS AND HAVE KING HUSSEIN USE HIS APPARENTLY IMPROVED INFLUENCE IN DAMASCUS TO MODERATE SYRIA'S DIPLOMATIC STANCE-- AN EFFORT THAT WE ALSO MIGHT LOOK AT GETTING THE SAUDIS TO SUPPORT. FURTHER, IT WOULD BE IN OUR INTEREST, WITHOUT GETTING IN BETWEEN SADAT AND HUSSEIN, TO DO WHAT WE CAN QUIETLY TO TRY TO HELP TO KNIT TOGETHER THE GROWING RIFT BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES.

10. JORDAN'S CONTRIBUTION TO POLITICAL STABILITY IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA IS SOMETIMES MORE ACCEPTABLE

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED USCINCEUR.

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 AMMAN 01135 03 OF 03 011357Z

43

ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W
----- 072004

R 011100Z MAR 76
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7130
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USINT BAGHDAD

S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 3 AMMAN 1135

EXDIS

DEPT PASS USCINCEUR

THAN OURS, AND IT HELPS CONTINUE THE FLOW TO AMMAN
OF ARAB OIL PRODUCING STATES' FINANCIAL SUBSIDIES
THAT OTHERWISE WE MIGHT BE LOOKED ON TO SUPPLY. WE
WANT TO ASSIST JORDAN IN ITS MODEST PROGRAM OF
SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO THE GULF AND CONTRIBUTE TO
ITS ABILITY TO DO SO. THUS, WE SHOULD CONTINUE HIGH
LEVEL CONSULTATIONS WITH KING HUSSEIN ON DEVELOPMENTS
IN THE PENINSULA AND SEEK QUICK RESPONSES FROM THE
DEPARGMET TO HIS REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION AND OUR
HELP FOR HIS INITIATIVES.

11. WE HAVE LESS IMPACT NOW ON JORDAN'S
ALIGNMENT WITH THE ARAB BLOC ON MIDDLE EAST ISSUES,
ALTHOUGH JORDAN SOMETIMES TRIES TO EXERT A MODERATE
INFLUENCE INPRIVATE DISCUSSIONS OF ARAB STATES.
JORDAN'S OTHER INTERESTS AS A SMALL, CONCERVATIVE
STATE BORDERED BY MORE POWERFUL AND IN SOME CASES
RADICAL NEIGHBORS AND POSSESSING FEW NATURAL
RESOURCES, HOWEVER,PROCIDE US WITH OPPORTUNITIES TO
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 AMMAN 01135 03 OF 03 011357Z

KEEP JORDAN FROM VOTING IN BLANKET FASHION WITH
THIRD WORLD BOLCS. WE PLAN TO RELY ON THE
DEPARTMENZT'S NEW IO/MLA OFFICE MORE TIMELY
INFORMATION TO ENCOURAGE JORDAN TO LOOK AT
MULTILATERAL ISSUES IN TERMS OF THEIR AFFECT ON
ITS SPECIAL INTERESTS, ESPECIALLY THE NON-MIDDLE
EAST ISSUES.

12. KING HUSSEIN'S GOVERNMENT SEEMS THE BEST
JORDANIAN REGIME TO SERVE OUR INTERESTS OF ANY OF
THE LIKELY ALTERNATIVES--I.E, EAST BANKERS WITH AN
ISOLAIONIST OUTLOOK OR, HOWEVER UNLIKELY IT APPEARS
NOW, A PALESTINIAN MORE PRO-PLO,AND ACTIVELY ANTI-ISRAEL
GOVERNMENT. WHILE WE KNOW OF NO IMMEDIATE THREAT
TO THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT, THERE IS SOME SDISGRUNTLEMENT
WITHIN THE ARMED FORCES AND AMONG CIVILIANS ABOUT
INFLATION, ALLEDED SLIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS EAST BANKERS
IN ASSIGNMENTS AND PROMOTIONS, RUMORS OF CORRUPTION
AND NEPOTIS, AND THE KING'S INFATUATION WITH
FOREGIN AND MILITARY MATTER TO THE NEGLECT OF
DOMESTIC DECELOPMENT AND SOCIAL EQUITY. OUR ABILITY
IS LIMITED TO AMELIORATE SUCH INTERNAL POLITICAL
WEAKNESSES (WHICH ARE NOT IMMINENT THREATS,) BUT
WE INTEND TO DIRECT MISSION PROGRAMS WERE APPROPRIATE
AND FEASIBLE TOWARD INCREASING GOJ'S CONCERN
AND ACTION ON QUESTION SOF POLITICAL BALANCE, LON-
TERM ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, AND SOCIAL JUSTICE. OUR
ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE WILL CONTINUE TO SHIFT FROM
BUDGET SUPPORT TO A MORE PROJECT- ORIENTED
DEVELOPMENTAL PROGRAM.
PICKERING

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED USCINCEUR.

SECRET

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: FOREIGN RELATIONS, POLICIES, INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 01 MAR 1976
Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: morefirh
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1976AMMAN01135
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D760077-0380
From: AMMAN
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1976/newtext/t197603109/aaaadsix.tel
Line Count: 418
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION SS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 8
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: morefirh
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 26 MAY 2004
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <26 MAY 2004 by fisherem>; APPROVED <26 MAY 2004 by morefirh>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
04 MAY 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: ANNUAL POLICY ASSESSMENT
TAGS: PINT, PFOR, US, JO
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006